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Abstract
 In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to organized crime. 
Some attacks have left horrific scenes, meant to send messages to the public or government. Debate continues about 
how to characterize this violence, and some observers describe it as “terrorism” or its perpetrators as “terrorists.” 
This article emphasizes that Mexico has experienced terrorist tactics by criminal organizations. This implies that 
while the perpetrators are better thought of (and dealt with) as criminal groups, some of their violence at least 
partially fulfills the criteria to be defined as terrorism. The use of terrorist tactics by criminal groups is an under-
studied aspect of the crime-terror nexus because more research examines crime by terrorist groups. The article 
discusses three tactics seen in Mexico: bombings, violent communication, and attacks against politicians. It then 
presents comparable examples from other countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, Italy, and Russia. Similarities and 
differences between criminal groups and terrorist groups are discussed. The violence in Mexico is relatively unique 
for its scale, for the number of people killed, but in general the use of terrorist tactics by criminal organizations is 
not new.    
Keywords: Terrorist tactics, terrorist groups, organized crime, Mexico
Introduction
Car bombs send shrapnel through crowded urban areas, detonated remotely by cell phone. Tortured bodies 
displayed with threatening messages to the public or government. Politicians gunned down because of their 
work. 
These scenes might evoke modern-day Syria or Afghanistan, or Northern Ireland during The Troubles, but 
they have occurred in recent years in Mexico, as criminal organizations fight the government and each other 
for the lucrative market of US-bound drugs. The violence in Mexico has left more than 100,000 dead, 30,000 
disappeared, and is often shocking for its brutality.[1] A growing line of research seeks to understand the 
causes of the crisis.[2] However, important questions remain regarding how to categorize the violence, espe-
cially the most horrifying acts, and how to classify the non-state groups carrying out the carnage. 
What is the best way to understand the violence in Mexico? Do we see acts of terrorism, as commonly de-
fined? Is it helpful to describe the violent subnational groups as terrorist organizations? The literature is 
mixed on these questions. For example, Campbell and Hansen argue that we see “terrorism” in Mexico, 
while Longmire and Longmire assert that the drug trafficking organizations should be labelled “terrorist 
groups.”[3]. Other scholars, such as Flanigan and Williams, dispute these characterizations.[4] Williams 
argues that the violence is not terrorism because it lacks a political motivation, and is usually more selective 
than indiscriminate. He presents several explanations for the extreme criminal violence, including the notion 
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of strategic competition where violence is a “continuation of business by other means.” 
These questions are important for reasons beyond the Mexican case. Scholars of political violence increas-
ingly study groups typically characterized as criminals.[5] In the broader “crime-terror nexus” literature, one 
can identify three main areas of investigation: a substantial line of work on crime by terrorist groups, some 
research on alliances between criminal and terrorist groups, but less on potential terror by criminal groups.
[6] On Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum, one of the stages is criminal groups using “terrorist tactics for 
operational purposes” – but less is written about this topic than other elements on the continuum.[7] 
Beyond academic discussions, politicians and the press are inconsistent in their descriptions of such violence. 
This suggests policymaking challenges. News media accounts sometimes refer to attacks in Mexico as “ter-
rorism” or “narco-terrorism,” and the previous Mexican president described perpetrators as “terrorists.”[8] 
The frameworks used by policymakers are important because if a problem is misdiagnosed, it is not likely to 
receive the appropriate treatment. For example, the Salvadoran government declared groups such as MS-13 
“terrorist organizations,” authorizing extraordinary judicial powers, which some analysts suggest is problem-
atic.[9]  Counterterrorism or counterinsurgency approaches can backfire when used against criminal groups.
[10] 
This article contributes to these debates by building on work by Williams and others, emphasizing that 
Mexico is experiencing terrorist tactics by criminal organizations. This implies that the violent groups are 
not “terrorist organizations” as typically defined, but they use tactics that have a great deal in common with 
more politically motivated actors. This focus suggests that while full-scale counterterrorism is unlikely to be 
effective, some lessons from counterterrorism can be carefully employed to address certain tactics. It is also 
emphasized that terrorist tactics by criminal groups are not unprecedented. After discussing examples of 
terrorist tactics in Mexico, the article describes similar tactics used by criminal groups in countries such as 
Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Italy, and Russia. The Mexican case is unique for the scale of its violence, but 
most of the tactics are part of a repertoire that appears repeatedly in the history of organized crime. 
The next section discusses terrorism, terrorist tactics, and terrorist groups. Then, examples of Mexican crimi-
nal groups’ terrorist tactics are discussed. Three variations are considered: bombings, violent communication, 
and attacks on politicians. After this, historical examples are discussed of criminal organizations in other 
countries using these same tactics. The conclusion presents some policy suggestions, as well as implications 
for the study of terrorism and crime.
Terrorism, Terrorist Tactics, and Terrorist Groups
The definition of terrorism is of course widely debated. However, there are criteria that appear in many or 
most definitions. Schmid and Jongman’s survey of more than 100 definitions indicates that three elements 
appear in the majority of terrorism definitions: (1) violence, (2) fear or terror is emphasized, generally toward 
a wide audience, and (3) a political motivation.[11] Many definitions mention other elements, such as civil-
ian victims (discussed below), but these three elements are the only to appear in the majority of definitions 
surveyed by Schmid and Jongman.[12] 
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The first element, violence, is probably the least controversial. Terrorism is violence, perpetrated or threat-
ened. The second element is the notion of fear, or the namesake terror. Terrorism is not only violence to dam-
age or destroy a target but communicative violence, to influence third parties. Definitions mention creating 
an environment of fear, threats, psychological effects, or other related dynamics. For this reason, some defini-
tions explicitly mention civilians as targets of terrorism, while others specify the broader grouping of non-
combatants. Terrorism is shocking, in some ways unpredictable, because it is generally designed to strike fear 
into the wider population. The specific audience is often the general public, which could be at the national or 
international level. Additional potential audiences include the government or particular ethnic or religious 
groups.
The third element is crucial to the discussion regarding Mexico and comparable cases: terrorism is political 
violence. Motive is an essential element of the terrorist definition, and violence without such a motive is likely 
to be considered more common crime. There is something perhaps intuitive, to many scholars at least, that 
there is a unique category of violence that seeks to disrupt or replace governments, to create nation-states, 
or to change foreign policy.[13] If the objective of an act of violence is to allow its perpetrators to continue 
to conduct illegal business, this is more commonly thought of as crime. Political objectives imply a different 
type of violence. One reason political violence deserves its separate category is that violence with political 
motivations often has political solutions. Thus, there are policy reasons to focus on terrifying violence with 
political motivations separately from that which has other motivations, such as pure profit-seeking.  
The requirement of a political motive suggests that the violence we see in Mexico is not usually “terrorism” as 
traditionally defined. The perpetrators do not act with a political motivation – such as imposing a particular 
ideology or religion on the government – but instead usually a purely criminal motivation. Their primary 
objective is to make money. Their fundamental relationship with the state is that they want it to leave them 
alone. Beyond the lack of political motivation, the violent groups in Mexico do not usually direct their com-
municative violence at the general public, as terrorism typically does. The groups seem to be communicating 
more to rival groups than other actors, as is discussed below.[14]   
While most of the drug-related violence in modern Mexico is not terrorism as usually defined, there are 
actions that could be considered terrorist tactics. I would contend that any actions that have the first two ele-
ments are terrorist tactics, violence to strike fear into others beyond the immediate victims. Even if an action 
is not technically terrorism (according to many authors) because it lacks the political motivation, it still could 
make sense to categorize it as terrorist-like violence. This is consistent with the characterization that a Mex-
ican international affairs expert, Mauricio Meschoulam, has used for certain shocking acts of criminal vio-
lence in Mexico, “quasi-terrorism.”[15] 
The use of the phrase “terrorist tactics” for violence that does not fully meet the definition of terrorism is 
found in other contexts. For example, many scholars specify that terrorism is non-governmental or subna-
tional violence – by individuals or groups. This is because similar state violence has other names (e.g., human 
rights violations, war crimes) and legal structures, and often has diverse causal explanations. Nonetheless, 
scholars still find it useful to talk about “terrorist tactics by governments” when discussing states intentionally 
targeting civilians.[16] This is consistent with Tilly’s contention that a broad range of actors, including orga-
nized crime, use terror as a strategy. He argues: “From Mafiosi to ruthless governments, people who operate 
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protection rackets intermittently deploy terror against enemies and uncertain clients.”[17]  
If the Mexican criminal organizations use terrorist tactics, are they terrorist organizations? It is not clear that 
this label makes sense due to the primary motivations of the groups. This is probably why – although there 
is debate – many contend that it makes more sense to think of the drug-trafficking groups as criminal orga-
nizations, not terrorists or insurgents.[18] Shelley and Picarelli notably argue that it is motives that separate 
terrorist and criminal groups, even if they sometimes use similar or the same methods.[19] This is consis-
tent with definitions of “terrorist groups” in the literature, which have been defined as “subnational political 
organizations that use terrorism (emphasis added).”[20] Prominent databases of terrorist groups assembled 
for the study of terrorist group lethality or longevity do not includes groups such as the Medellín Cartel or 
drug-trafficking groups in Mexico.[21] The idea of considering attributes of groups – and not simply their 
actions – is consistent with Sánchez-Cuenca and De la Calle’s argument that there are “actor” and “action” 
notions of terrorism.[22]  
It is true that criminal groups use violence with some political implications, such as killing politicians (dis-
cussed below), and many observers describe the Mexican groups as seeking to “control territory.” Howev-
er, violence against the state is usually with the ultimate aim of being left alone – not because the criminal 
groups want a particular ideology or religion represented in government. Furthermore, “territorial control” 
when it comes to criminal groups refers to being permitted to freely conduct business, and not a desire to be 
responsible for public goods provision in a geographic area, for example, or writing legislation about school 
curricula.         
Additionally, in terms of policy, it has been noted that given the distinct motivations across group types, 
some counterterrorism tactics are unlikely to have the desired effects on criminal groups. This explains why 
tactics such as leadership removal have distinct consequences depending on whether the target is a criminal 
group or a more politically motivated group.[23] Overall, for theoretical and policy-based reasons, the label 
of “terrorist group” is not helpful for these groups. The conclusion discusses more differences between these 
groups types, but their tactical similarities are worth examining in detail.  
 
Terrorist Tactics by Mexican Criminal Organizations
Criminal organizations in Mexico have used a number of terrorist or terrorist-like tactics. This section focus-
es on three tactics often associated with terrorism: bombings, violent communication, and violence against 
politicians. These tactics are chosen because they have been widely observed in Mexico, and seem to match 
up with behavior commonly used by traditionally-defined terrorist organizations. These are not the only 
terrorist tactics that exist, of course. However, the three tactics mentioned are those that have occurred most 
commonly in Mexico.  
Bombing in Mexico
Although terror can be wrought with any weapon, perhaps none conjures up the image of “terrorism” as well 
as a bomb. The invention of dynamite in the 1860s is said to have helped usher in a new type of terrorism, 
giving a powerful tool to Russian anarchists or nihilists seeking to make a mark.[24] Attacks with explosives 
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have drawn international headlines after attacks such as Oklahoma City 1995, Omagh (Northern Ireland) 
1998, and the London transit system in 2005, to say nothing of countless vehicle-borne and roadside bombs 
in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent decades. One analyst argued that bombings remain the “most likely terror-
ist method of inflicting mass casualties.”[25]  
Car bombs are one type of explosive tactic that Mexican criminal organizations have employed repeatedly 
over the years, although fortunately the devices have not killed many people. More than 20 car bombs ex-
ploded or were disarmed by police between 2010 and 2012, according to Bunker and Sullivan.[26] The most 
notorious device was in Ciudad Juárez in 2010, which was rigged to kill first responders rushing to a false 
report of a killed police officer. A dead person was in the car wearing a police uniform, but as emergency 
personnel approached it, a cell phone-activated device detonated, killing two police officers, one paramedic, 
and a civilian.[27] Car bombs are not new in Mexican organized crime. Bunker and Sullivan report several 
car bombings in the 1990s, including one intended to kill “El Chapo” Guzman in 1992, and another in 1994 
that killed at least five people and wounded 15. Criminal organizations keep using car bombs, or at least try 
to. In 2015, in the border city of Ciudad Juárez, authorities found a Volkswagen Beatle containing enough 
explosives to produce a 40-meter blast radius.[28] 
While Mexican criminal organizations use a number of types of explosives, they frequently use hand gre-
nades in particular.[29] One of the most terrorist-like attacks by criminal groups in Mexico, involved cartel 
members throwing hand grenades into the crowded main square of the city of Morelia during Independence 
Day celebrations in 2008. The attack killed eight people and wounded more than 100. The precise motive 
behind the attack is unclear, and two rival criminal organizations blamed each other.[30] The lack of a claim 
for the massacre makes for an interesting comparison with terrorist organizations, which often claim their 
attacks. Furthermore, some experts believe the attack was one of many intended to calentar la plaza (heat up 
the turf), where one group carries out an attack to draw authorities’ attention on a rival.[31]        
Hand grenades have been used in other attacks, as military fragmentation grenades are often stolen from the 
military. Criminals have used hand grenades during attacks on newspaper offices, and as recently as a 2017 
attack in Cancún on the state’s attorney general.[32] Beyond hand grenades, in 2015 cartel members used a 
rocket-propelled grenade to shoot down a Mexican Army helicopter.[33]  
Criminal organizations in Mexico, like terrorist organizations, have been prolific with explosives, but is 
important to note that the targets of criminal group bombings are often different from the typical targets of 
terrorist groups. Mexican criminal organizations usually target the authorities or rival groups, while terrorist 
groups are known for attacking random civilians. These distinctions are not completely clear cut, as the gre-
nade attack in Morelia illustrates. Furthermore, many terrorist groups target security forces and rival groups. 
However, the typical targets of each group type are distinct. 
Violent Communication in Mexico
Regardless of the weapon used, a great deal of violence by Mexican criminal groups could be qualified as 
terrorist tactics because of its public and communicative nature. Violent, public communication by criminal 
groups is surprising because criminal organizations, unlike terrorists, are said to avoid publicity and not care 
about affecting public opinion.[34] Yet we see many examples of public messaging. Perhaps the first attack 
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that put Mexican criminal violence on the radar of the international media was a horrific 2006 spectacle by 
La Familia, a group in the southern state of Michoacán. About 20 black-clad armed members of the group 
entered a nightclub after midnight, fired shots into the ceiling, and threw five human heads on the dance 
floor. Along with the heads, they left a note saying that they were carrying out “divine justice,” and asserting 
that they do not kill women or the innocent.[35] This display is remarkable not only for the deployment of 
human heads in a crowded establishment, but because the group went to such lengths to send a message, to 
speak out to the community.     
The use of decapitation has been shockingly frequent in the drug war, with the Mexican government report-
ing 1,303 decapitated bodies in the country between 2007 and 2011.[36] Many of the decapitations led to 
gruesome public displays, for example when 49 headless bodies were dumped along the highway near the city 
of Monterrey in 2012. Interestingly, the use of this tactic took off around the same time that groups in Iraq 
were using similar methods to draw attention with Internet videos. 
One author suggested that ISIS learned about publicizing decapitation from Mexican groups.[37] This is 
unlikely. The first publicized display of heads in 21st century Mexico was apparently in 2006, while ISIS 
predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq decapitated American Nick Berg in 2004, in a video that was widely distributed 
online.[38] It is likely that there was some co-evolution, with both types of groups learning from each oth-
er’s online butchery as the years went on. This emulation and diffusion of terrorist tactics between terrorist 
groups and criminal groups is worthy of additional research.
Mexican criminal organizations have spread messages in a number of other ways. A prominent tactic has 
been the narcomensaje, or literally “narco-message,” the use of banners or signs hung in public places with a 
note from a criminal group to the public. The banners are sometimes accompanied with a human body, or 
body parts. The text of the narco-messages can include threats to government officials or rival groups, warn-
ings not to inform to the police, or declarations of territorial control. Thousands of narco-messages have been 
found since 2006. In an interesting contrast with traditional terrorism, these narco-messages are not usually 
intended for a national or global audience. One study found that they are addressed to rival groups more 
than any other type of actor.[39]  
The narco-message banners are just one part of criminal group publicity campaigns, as they also have used 
graffiti and social media to spread their messages to the public.[40] This type of public communication is 
noteworthy because terrorist organizations use similar types of messenging strategies. For example, terror-
ist groups in Northern Ireland have painted murals to warn rivals and show control over territory.[41] Both 
types of groups use public messages such as banners or graffiti for many types of messages, as is discussed 
below. 
An additional way that criminal groups in Mexico have drawn public attention to send a message is when 
they simultaneously block multiple main roads or highways in a city. This is referred to as narcobloqueos, or 
narco-road-blocks. The narcobloqueos apparently began in 2010 with armed men forcing motorists out of 
their cars, and leaving the cars blocking the roadway.[42] On many occasions, the cars have been lit on fire. 
Sometimes this tactic is used simply to slow the arrival of authorities, to allow crime to proceed unimpeded. 
Frequently, however, crime groups shut down streets to send a message about who controls the city, or as a 
show of force. In July 2017, a narcobloqueo was employed for the first time in Mexico City. After the leader 
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of a local gang was killed in a shootout with Marines, three buses and a dump truck were set on fire in busy 
intersections, blocking central streets.[43]
Politicians Attacked in Mexico
In spite of the less-political nature of criminal organizations, compared with insurgents or terrorists, their 
violence clearly often affects politics and politician. One direct indication of this is attacks on politicians. Like 
the use of the bomb, attacking politicians is an age-old terrorist tactic. From the Zealots two thousand years 
ago to the anarchists who attacked Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and U.S. President William McKinley 
more than 100 years ago, killing politicians is a sure way to draw attention and try to affect politics. Campbell 
and Hansen mention criminal groups’ struggles for regional control as part of the reason that they think that 
some of the violence in Mexico is “narco-terrorism.”[44] Criminal organizations generally kill politicians not 
to affect politics for the same reasons insurgents do, such as changing the national government or its ideolo-
gy, but to get the government to not interfere in their business. This has been the case in Mexico.
In 2007, veteran politician Juan Antonio Guajardo Anzaldúa was running for mayor of Río Bravo, a bor-
der city near McAllen, Texas. He had already been the municipal president twice before. During this third 
campaign for municipal president, he accused political rivals of being paid off by organized crime. The area 
around Río Bravo, lucrative for organized crime given its proximity to the United States, was said to be con-
trolled by the Gulf Cartel. During the campaign, he was threatened repeatedly because of his outspokenness 
against organized crime. A few weeks after the election, as he stood on a sidewalk, two SUVs pulled up along-
side him gunshots rang out. Guarjardo and the five men with him were all shot dead.[45]
The following year, hitmen came for Salvador Vergara Cruz, the mayor of Ixtapan de la Sal, a resort town 
about 70 miles southwest of Mexico City. He was driving on the highway when another vehicle pulled up 
next to his and shooting started. Authorities later counted 13 bullet impacts in Vergara Cruz’s body. He was 
reportedly targeted because he was not letting organized crime extort local businesses.[46] On January 1, 
2016, Gisela Mota was sworn in as mayor of a city in the southern state of Morelos. In her inaugural speech, 
she discussed a number of topics, including her goal to root out corruption. The following day, at least four 
armed men forced their way into her house and executed her in front of her family.[47] These examples are 
part of a much wider pattern. Between 2006 and 2012, Mexican criminal organizations killed 18 state offi-
cials, 67 mayors, and 47 municipal officials, according to Trejo and Ley.[48] Blume counts more than 200 
politicians murdered by Mexican criminal groups between 2005 and 2015.[49] Beyond the deaths of these 
leaders, hundreds of lethal and non-lethal attacks were carried out against politicians, party officials, and ac-
tivists across the country. Interestingly, most of the attacks have been against local politicians, as opposed to 
federal or national officials. This is consistent with criminal violence in other countries, as discussed below.
In the section on explosives by Mexican criminal groups, it was noted that the criminal groups usually target 
authorities or rival groups – as opposed to the random civilians often attacked by terrorist groups. Similar-
ly, while both terrorists and criminals target politicians, they do so in distinct ways. Terrorist groups often 
target national-level politicians, since their motivation is usually national or international politics. In Mexico, 
criminal groups have mostly targeted local politicians. Terrorists attack politicians for their specific political 
views, and for simply representing the government – a symbolic attack expected to destabilize the country.
[50] Criminal groups, however, often attack politicians for refusing to be complicit in business. 
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The Historical Record of Terrorist Tactics by Criminal Organizations
The above evidence intends to make clear that terrorist tactics have been used widely by criminal groups in 
Mexico. However, the use of such tactics by groups primarily motivated by financial gains is not unusual. This 
section presents examples of comparable tactics used by criminal organizations in other countries.
Bombings by Criminal Groups 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Medellín Cartel waged a virtual war on the Colombian government and 
competitor groups to maintain its power as a cocaine producer. Attacks on the government – and the public – 
were an effort to get the government to stop interfering with its business. The deadliest bombing was the 1989 
explosion of a commercial jet, Avianca Flight 203, which killed 110 people.[51] The same year, the Medellín 
Cartel sent a bus loaded with 500 kilograms of dynamite to the Administrative Department of Security, and 
the explosion killed 63 people and injured 600.[52] These were some of the more shocking attacks, but the 
group bombed countless businesses of rival groups, government buildings, and seemingly random targets 
during the period. There was also a bombing near the U.S. embassy as early as 1984, wounding six people, 
shortly after the Colombian government announced it would extradite drug traffickers to the United States.
[53]             
During 1993, the Sicilian Mafia carried out a series of car bombings in Florence, Milan, and Rome, killing 
10 people and wounding dozens.[54] Damaged buildings included historic churches and the Uffizi Gallery, 
the largest repository of Renaissance art.[55] Attacking cultural heritage sites is noteworthy because criminal 
organizations had used car bomb attacks as an assassination tactic for a long time, but those attacks usually 
had been directed at single individuals and not random civilians. (Even Youngstown, Ohio, as far back as 
the 1950s, saw car bombs as an organized crime murder weapon dozens of times.[56]) The Italian attacks 
in 1993, however, were in tourist-filled areas to coerce the government into stopping their crackdown on 
organized crime. An anti-Mafia investigator stated at the time, “It is a strategy of terror that is in the Mafia’s 
interest now.[57] 
In Russia as well, organized crime groups have employed bombing as a tactic on many occasions. Car bombs, 
for example, have been widely used. The first car bomb to hit Moscow came in 1994, according to the New 
York Times, with a remotely-detonated device that was intended for a business leader but decapitated his lim-
ousine driver instead.[58] The tactic continued into the early 2000s.[59] Beyond car bombs, criminal groups 
in the 1990s in particular regularly used explosives to eliminate and intimidate their opponents. In 1996, a 
bomb in a cemetery killed 14 people gathered at a memorial service, and there are reasons to believe the blast 
was related to organized crime.[60] In 2000, a bomb in a market killed three people and injured 11 others. 
The interior minister at the time said, “This situation doesn’t have any relation to terror in the widely under-
stood sense. This was a local conflict.”[61]
Criminal groups have also used explosives in recent years in a perhaps surprising location: Sweden. The city 
of Malmo witnessed more than 100 grenade explosions between 2014 and 2016. Local authorities attributed 
the violence to organized crime, and indicated that the devices generally come from the Balkans.[62] Beyond 
grenades, a local justice center was bombed twice during 2014. Each attack happened at night, not causing 
major injuries, but the blasts damaged the entryway and shattered windows of nearby buildings.[63] In 2017, 
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a similar explosion hit the entrance of a justice center in nearby Helsingborg.[64] Fortunately, these attacks 
generally did not attack the public randomly, but were generally targeted at specific people or government 
buildings. This marks a difference between most bombings by organized crime and bombings by terrorist 
organizations.
Violent Communication by Criminal Groups 
Criminal organizations outside of Mexico have also used violence including threats as part of overt, public 
communication. In Brazil, criminal groups have orchestrated deadly prison riots and shut down cities with 
burning buses – not unlike Mexican narcobloqueos – to intimidate the government and rival gangs.[65] 
Widespread coordinated prison riots first occurred in the country in 2001, when an uprising began in 29 
prisons at noon on February 18. This was a response to the planned separation of imprisoned criminal group 
leaders.[66] A more substantial uprising occurred in 2006, when prison riots were accompanied by bomb-
ings, bus-burnings, and attacks on government buildings in Sao Paulo that left more than 100 people dead. 
Beyond these large-scale operations, criminal groups in Brazil have printed pamphlets explaining their ac-
tions, hung banners, and funded music that celebrates themselves. The overall public communication strategy 
of the groups has been described by Brazilian military sources as “psychological operations.”[67] 
In Central America, criminal groups have also used expressive or communicative violence in ways usually 
associated with insurgent or terrorist organizations. In Honduras in 2004, gang members used automatic 
weapons to kill 28 people on a bus – reportedly to get the government to back off its tough-on-crime policies.
[68] The attackers were apparently from the group MS-13. In 2015 in El Salvador, MS-13 and Barrio 18 asked 
the government to negotiate a peace deal with them. When the state indicated that it would not bargain, and 
further cracked down on organized crime, the gangs demanded that bus drivers go on strike. Around 1,000 
buses stopped running, but gang members still burned two buses and killed seven bus drivers who failed to 
comply.[69] 
Milder forms of criminal public communication are also visible. For decades, street gangs in the United States 
and beyond have openly expressed themselves with graffiti in public places. Graffiti is used to mark territory, 
but a range of other reasons exist as well, such as memorializing the dead or indicating enemies and allies.
[70] Graffiti often threatens violence, even implicitly, such as when one person crosses out another person’s 
name, or a group’s name, which is usually interpreted as a threat or intimidation.[71] 
Beyond graffiti, criminal groups have used other methods of threatening public communication, from press 
releases to claiming their violence. “The Extraditables” was a public relations operation of Colombia’s Me-
dellín Cartel to convince the government to not extradite cartel leaders. Either as the Extraditables or on its 
own, the Medellín Cartel frequently claimed attacks and sent messages to politicians and the public with their 
violence.[72] For example, when they kidnapped the mayor of Bogotá, they sent an explanation to media 
outlets. Interestingly, in a move reminiscent of terrorists’ indignation about being called “terrorists,” the com-
muniqué uses considerable space to expresses anger about being called a “mafia.”[73] Overall, the Medellín 
Cartel was unusual at the time for its public messaging, the communicative nature of its violence, but this 
behavior would later be replicated and in some ways increased by Mexican criminal organizations.   
More recently, the Internet is also frequently used by organized crime to send violent public messages. In 
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Italy, criminal groups have threatened politicians by delivering an envelope with a bullet in it, or a box with 
an animal’s head. However, a 2011 report outlines the increase in anonymous blog threats to local politicians. 
One mayor in Southern Italy indicated that the writers on one blog “know my movements.” He also said, “I 
don’t feel safe.”[74] In another case in Australia, the leader of an outlaw biker gang used a Facebook fan page 
to insult police and taunt rival gangs.[75] These Internet examples are more subtle than others mentioned 
above, but overall the public displays discussed in this section contrast with the notion of criminal organiza-
tions keeping a low profile.
Politicians Attacked by Criminal Groups 
Attacking politicians is a clearly political consequence of organized crime, even if the criminal groups are not 
primarily motivated by political ambitions. This behavior has been observed around the world. In Italy, more 
than 130 local elected officials and administrators have been killed since the 1970s.[76] Beyond local politi-
cians, some national or regional leaders were targeted as well. In 1992, three weeks before national elections, 
a Mafia gunman on a motorcycle assassinated Salvo Lima, a member of the European Parliament and former 
mayor of Palermo.[77] When the government responded with arrests of Mafia leaders, two of the country’s 
top prosecutors or magistrates were killed. The Cosa Nostra reportedly also planned to assassinate then-New 
York Governor Mario Cuomo when he visited Italy in 1992, but called off the hit at the last minute when they 
realized the governor’s security detail was bigger than expected.[78] 
Criminal groups in El Salvador have also killed politicians. In 2016, at least two mayors were killed, as well 
as other party officials.[79] In this country, as in other cases, the line between criminal and political becomes 
blurry, especially at municipal-level politics. One example is when a mayor reportedly had a pact with a crim-
inal group so that they would not extort local businesses. He allegedly ordered several of the group members 
to assassinate a political rival, and the group was willing because the victim has not been paying them extor-
tion.[80] A more prominent case was when several national legislators from El Salvador were killed in 2007 
while in Guatemala. The corpses of the three politicians were found in a burned car, and the bodies had bullet 
wounds and signs of torture. Various people were arrested for the crime, but no one was ever convicted. It 
was believed that the attack was related to drug trafficking.[81] “The motive was not robbery,” a representa-
tive of the Salvadoran president said at the time.[82]
In Russia in the 1990s, many politicians were killed. It is difficult to distinguish politically-motivated killings 
from those associated with organized crime, but many killings were widely understood to be connected to 
criminal groups. For example, in 1994, parliament member Andrei Aizderzis was shot to death at his door-
step shortly after his newspaper printed a list of 266 people alleged to be organized crime figures.[83] The 
following year, legislator Sergei Skorochkin was kidnapped and killed. In a previous incident, he had killed a 
man who he claimed was a mafia member attacking him. Prosecutors ruled that Skorochkin acted in self-de-
fense in that case.[84] 
Conclusion
How should we characterize the violence that has affected Mexico since 2006? This article has argued that 
there are important differences between actors primarily motivated by political motivations (terrorist or 
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insurgent organizations) and actors primarily motivated by illicit economic motivations (criminal organi-
zations). However, the latter often use tactics that could at least be described as terrorist tactics. The Mexico 
case is an important example of this phenomenon. Three tactics seen in Mexico were discussed: bombings, 
violent communication, and attacks on politicians. It was also emphasized that the Mexico case is not com-
pletely unique, because these three types of violence have been used by criminal groups elsewhere. Examples 
were discussed in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Italy, and Russia. 
Characterizing the Mexican situation as criminal groups using terrorist tactics has implications for policy – 
in Mexico or in other countries facing similar threats. Labelling the groups as criminal organizations implies 
that law enforcement approaches are generally the best way to confront them. As noted above, the apparently 
direct application of counterinsurgency methods has not worked as intended. However, since these groups 
sometimes use terrorist tactics, some aspects of counterterrorism could be applied to address these specific 
tactics. For example, a modified version of counter-messaging or counter-narratives could help mitigate the 
effects of violent communication.[85] Related to this, the roles of the news media and social media should be 
considered. Such media are essential for spreading the messages desired by those using terrorist tactics.[86] 
More broadly, research on the challenges of counterterrorism in democracies – and tradeoffs with free speech 
and other civil liberties, for example – is likely to have important lessons for democratic governments such as 
Mexico facing criminal groups using terrorist tactics.[87]     
While this article focused on similarities between criminal and terrorist groups, it is important to emphasize 
that there are key differences as well. The notion of economic motives vs. political motives has important 
implications. As noted earlier, policies such as leadership removal have different consequences depending on 
group type. In another example, the divergent motivations for groups have consequences for groups’ relation-
ships with the news media. Criminal groups are especially likely to attack journalists, trying to silence them.
[88] Meanwhile, “traditional” terrorists generally have a symbiotic relationship with the press, and depend 
on the media’s coverage.[89] Additionally, as noted, many of the seemingly terrorist tactics are quite distinct 
from traditional terrorism in that they are not trying to affect politics. As with the case of the grenade attacks 
in Morelia, the goal was apparently to draw authorities’ attention to a rival group. Other attacks are motivated 
by the simple goal of wanting to be left alone by law enforcement – not a desire to change legislation or for-
eign policy.[90] Furthermore, a great deal of criminal violence is related to intergroup rivalries, while only a 
small percentage of terrorist groups have attacked another terrorist group.[91] Overall, while criminal groups 
sometimes use terrorist tactics, they also operate in ways that are different from traditionally-defined terror-
ists. 
Future research can take a number of steps. First, there is room for more research on criminal groups using 
terrorist tactics, whether in Mexico or elsewhere. How does the employment of terrorist tactics by criminal 
organizations vary from group-to-group? Why do only some criminal groups, in certain times, engage in 
symbolic and shockingly public violence?[92] How else is this violence similar to or different from that of 
traditional terrorist groups? Research on the crime-terror nexus is increasing, but there has not been much 
empirical work on the subject by terrorism scholars beyond single case studies.   
Examples in this article come from a small number of countries, but organized crime exists throughout the 
world. Why does organized crime sometimes become extremely violent? Many experts say criminal groups 
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try to avoid violence and only use it as a “last resort.”[93] Many studies have examined single countries, such 
as Mexico, but there do not appear to be many cross-national studies looking at why similar patterns emerge 
in countries as diverse as Italy, Russia, and Brazil. It is also remarkable that the 1990s seemed to have been 
a critical moment for shocking violence by criminal organizations. These were watershed years for criminal 
violence in Colombia, Italy, and Russia. Was there a diffusion of tactics? To what extent were these groups 
learning from each other and/or terrorist organizations? In terrorism studies, it has been argued that terror-
ism can contribute to certain types of organizational success,[94] so this might explain the usage of tactics by 
political groups. To what extent can these lessons apply to why criminal groups use terrorist tactics? Why else 
did terrorist tactics by criminal organizations seem to take off in the 1990s? 
Do the determinants of terrorist tactics by criminal organizations compare to the factors that explain ter-
rorism as traditionally defined? The countries examined in this manuscript seem to have some elements in 
common with countries plagued by terrorism. They are all generally democracies. They tend to have had a 
history of terrorism proper or civil war. Russia and Colombia experienced terrorism and extreme organized 
crime violence at the same time. However, these countries also differ in important ways from countries 
that experience traditionally-defined terrorism. Some of the countries lack a polarized left-right ideological 
divide, and most lack a great deal of repression against an ethnic or religious minority. Another difference is 
that these countries all seem to have corruption issues, and corruption has not been shown to be important in 
explaining terrorism. 
Regarding the cases discussed, the article examined those with the most visible criminal organization vio-
lence. The visibility, however, could be due to the author’s location and reliance on English- and Spanish-lan-
guage news sources. Future research could attempt to examine other contexts, such as the triads in East Asia 
and beyond, the yakuza groups in Japan, D-Company in South Asia, or groups in Sub-Saharan Africa such as 
Nigeria’s confraternities.    
Overall, the boundaries between terrorists and criminals are debatable. Conceptual limits are helpful to avoid 
concepts becoming overly broad and thus meaningless. Nonetheless, the study of organized crime violence 
would benefit from drawing on terrorism research. Similarly, terrorism scholars should consider studying 
organized crime, where many familiar tactics occur regularly. The causes might be distinct from the causes of 
terrorism, but many of the consequences are unfortunately familiar.   
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